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Abstract In the short term at least, the outcome of the Scottish Independence
referendum has settled the constitutional status of Scotland as part of the United
Kingdom. During the referendum campaign, however, the major UK wide parties
committed themselves to conferring a package of enhanced devolved powers upon
Scotland in the event of a rejection of independence and the exact scope of these
powers is in the process of being finalised. Although this ignited calls in Wales and
Northern Ireland for an expansion of their own devolved powers, arguably more
strongly felt pressures in the aftermath of the referendum have concerned the ‘West
Lothian’ question; the fact that decisions on matters which only affect England are
taken by a UK Parliament that comprises representatives from all four constituent
parts of the UK, whereas the same matters are often legislated upon locally in those
other parts of the UK without the involvement of representatives from England.
There is much consensus on the need to address this anomaly of the current UK
constitutional framework, but less agreement on how this ought to be done. This
paper considers the debate over ‘English only votes’ at Westminster and identifies
several flaws to such an initiative, which it is argued make it a dangerous mecha-
nism that threatens the integrity of the UK. A new constitutional framework based
upon regional or federal mechanisms represents the most logical and workable step
forward, but it is doubtful whether sufficient political or public support exists for
such a development to take place. The Scottish referendum campaign highlighted, if
anything, the extent to which the UK’s future integrity is threatened by ideas of
political difference and constitutional reform must take account of such realities. It
must not be rushed, but based on sound logic and principle.
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Introduction
On 18 September 2014, the electorate of Scotland voted in a referendum to reject
Scottish independence by a 55–45 % margin. Whilst not precluding a similar
referendum being held at some future date, the continued status of Scotland as a
constituent part of the United Kingdom—albeit one endowed with substantial
devolved powers1—was settled in the short to medium term. The pro-Union UK
wide political parties had all pledged support during the campaign for the expansion
of Scotland’s autonomy in the event of a ‘no’ vote and,2 notwithstanding continued
debates over the exact scope of the enhanced powers to be devolved to the Scottish
governmental institutions,3 the main focus of the constitutional debate as far as the
UK is concerned quickly moved to settle on the ‘English question’.
Whereas Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all enjoy varying degrees of
power to take decisions affecting matters concerning their populations indepen-
dently of the Westminster Parliament, England enjoys no similar status. It is unique
in the sense that it is the only constituent part of the United Kingdom whose
interests are solely represented within the Westminster Parliament, which alone is
responsible for legislating on matters affecting England. The controversy, of course,
arises from the fact that this is a body comprising representatives of all four parts of
the UK and Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish members can vote on matters which
may in practice only affect England. In theory—and indeed in practice on some
notable occasions during the term of the Labour government 1997–20104—votes
which only concern England can be carried in the face of the opposition of a
majority of MPs representing English constituencies. At the same time, those
English MPs often have no entitlement to vote on the application of similar
measures to the other parts of the UK as the policy areas concerned have been
devolved to the institutions established in those regions. This is the so-called ‘West
Lothian question,’ or what in the broader context of the debate over England’s status
in a union where substantial power is devolved to all other constituent parts, is
preferable to term the ‘English question’.5
This paper seeks to consider the perceived problem posed by the unique status of
England in the current constitutional framework of the UK and possible
mechanisms for addressing it. It begins by providing some background upon the
constitutional development of the United Kingdom through the introduction of
devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to the present day. It then
briefly outlines the nature of the controversy caused by the ‘English question’,
before considering the recent move to introduce ‘English only’ votes in the
1 These are devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Scotland Acts of 1998 and 2012.
2 See Armstrong and Bowers (2015).
3 As well as pressures for further powers for the devolved institutions of Wales and Northern Ireland.
4 See below.
5 For a discussion of the nature of the ‘English Question’, see Hazell (2006).
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Westminster Parliament. In light of the dangers posed by this initiative, alternative
mechanisms of an English Parliament and the introduction of regional government
throughout England are touched upon. The latter option is arguably the preferred
option for addressing the ‘English question’, but the lack of enthusiasm for such a
move mean that ad hoc and piecemeal efforts to strengthen local power are perhaps
the best that can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.
Background: The United Kingdom from Inception Until the Present
Day
In historic terms, the present day United Kingdom is a relatively recent creation.
While England and Wales had been administered jointly since the mid-sixteenth
century, union between England and Scotland did not occur until the 1707 Act of
Union.6 Unlike Wales, however, Scotland has throughout its membership of the
union retained and operated its own legal, educational, and religious systems.7 The
1800 Acts of Union united the three constituent parts of Great Britain with Ireland in
the United Kingdom. Most of Ireland achieved independence in 1922, although the
six counties in the North where majority support existed for the union remained part
of the UK as Northern Ireland. With the exception of the Northern Irish Parliament,
which operated from 1921 until its suspension in 1972, the UK has functioned
essentially as a unitary state until relatively recently, with all executive and
legislative powers invested in the UK government and Westminster Parliament.
Pressure for devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and (following the
restoration of direct rule) Northern Ireland, built up from the 1960s onwards and
enjoyed the broad support of the Labour and Liberal/Liberal Democrat parties. The
attempts of the Callaghan government to establish Scottish and Welsh devolved
institutions in the late 1970s failed when the population of Wales rejected such a
move in a referendum, and a Scottish referendum on the establishment of an
Assembly with legislative powers failed—notwithstanding a majority vote in
favour—due to a statutory requirement that 40 % of the Scottish electorate support
the initiative.8 Following the election of the Labour government in 1997, fresh
referendums were held on the establishment of devolved institutions for Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland. Following positive votes,9 these came into existence in
1999, the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly enjoying primary
legislative powers. In subsequent developments, the Welsh Assembly was also
conferred with some primary legislative powers.10
While the constitutional status of Wales and Northern Ireland was largely settled,
the campaign for Scottish independence has surged since Scotland’s acquisition of
devolution. Support for Scottish independence can arguably be attributed in large
6 For a perspective on Scotland’s history as part of the UK, see Lord Sumption (2014).
7 See Ronen (1979: 73–79).
8 See Bochel et al. (1981).
9 On the Scottish referendum, see Michell et al. (1998).
10 On the systems of devolution in place, see Hadfield (2011: 216–232).
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part to political nationalism: the perception that Scotland’s political interests do not
converge with those of the United Kingdom as a whole, and only through its
independence can these be adequately protected. In general terms, Scottish politics
have tended to take place within a discourse that is to the left of those of the wider
UK. The outcomes of successive general elections reinforce this. Until the 2015
general election, the Labour Party had taken the overwhelming share of Scottish
parliamentary seats for several decades,11 and in an astonishing surge in electoral
popularity the SNP won all but three seats in Scotland in 2015.12 However, as from
2010 onwards, Scotland has often found itself governed at UK level by a
Conservative or Conservative led government lacking in much support in that
country.13 This at times has resulted in the charge that Scotland finds itself subjected
to policies its electorate have not supported, delivered by governments lacking a
popular mandate in Scotland. The tone of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the recent
independence referendum campaign reiterated such charges.14
The independence cause gained a boost with the ascent to power at Holyrood of
the Scottish National Party following the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections—re-
elected with a clear majority in 2011—and polling data has shown a gradual rise in
support for independence.15 The 2014 Independence Referendum was held
following negotiations between the Scottish executive and the UK government,
taking place with the consent of the UK government, which had committed itself to
honour the outcome of the process.16 Although some polling data published in the
later stages of the referendum campaign suggested there may be a narrow majority
in favour of independence,17 in the event Scotland’s electorate rejected this by a
55–45 % margin.18
11 In the 2005 and 2010 general elections, Labour won 41/59 Scottish parliamentary seats. In the
previous general elections it took respectively 56/72 (2001 and 1997) and 49/72 (1992).
12 The Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties each took one seat to the SNP’s fifty-six.
13 In the post-WWII era the Conservative Party has not taken the largest number of seats in Scotland
since 1955. In recent decades, its support in Scotland has plummeted. It won no seats there in the 1997
general election and has only taken one seat in the successive four general elections.
14 See, e.g., the Scottish Government’s white paper, Scotland’s Future (2013). The importance for
independence in ensuring that Scotland’s political interests are protected is emphasised throughout.
Among the key arguments advanced are that ‘‘Decisions about Scotland will be taken by…those who live
and work here’’ (p. xii) and ‘‘Governments will always be formed by parties that win elections in
Scotland. It will no longer be possible for key decisions to be made by governments that do not command
the support of the Scottish electorate’’ (p. xii). See further pp. 40–47.
15 Lynch (2005: 510–513).
16 On legal issues surrounding the referendum, see Tierney (2013).
17 See ‘Scottish independence: Vote ‘will go to the wire’’, BBC News Online, 7 September 2014,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29096458.
18 However, the pressures for independence do not appear to have gone away. Although support for the
SNP cannot be assumed to equate with support for independence, its unprecedented 50 % share of the
vote in Scotland in the 2015 general election arguably reinforces this. Furthermore, the SNP have
declined to rule out another independence referendum in the near future. See, e.g., ‘Nicola Sturgeon
refuses to rule out fresh Scottish independence referendum during the next parliament’, The Independent,





Arguably a key factor in delivering the ‘No’ vote was the pledge of all of the pro-
union parties to enhance the autonomy of the devolved Scottish institutions. This,
however, has only contributed to a strengthened feeling in the other constituent parts
of the UK that they are somehow disadvantaged within the current UK
constitutional arrangement. Although a body of opinion in both Wales and Northern
Ireland favours enhanced powers for their own devolved institutions,19 our present
focus is upon the ‘English question’.
The ‘English Question’
A core aspect of the ‘English question’ was famously raised by the Labour MP Tam
Dalyell in the 1970s and labelled the ‘West Lothian’ question after the constituency
which he represented at the time. Raised during debates in the House of Commons
over devolution proposals for Scotland and Wales, Dalyell asked ‘‘For how long
will English constituencies and English honourable members tolerate…members
from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an important, and probably
often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves have no say in the
matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.’’20 Although hypothetical at the
time in light of the failure to devolve powers to the UK’s constituent parts, the issue
became pertinent two decades later following the creation of the devolved
institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.
The position brought about by devolution, whereby many matters affecting
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are determined in their devolved bodies
without any English involvement while at the same time those matters affecting just
England are decided upon by a UK-wide Parliament in which non-English MPs
retain the power to cast a vote, has been the source of considerable grievance for
English politicians and voters alike.21 The resulting situation might be criticised on
the related grounds of fairness and democracy. It may be regarded as
inequitable that those representing some parts of the UK are able to influence
matters affecting another part of the UK when the representatives of that part may
not similarly influence matters in the other parts of the UK, there being a lack of
reciprocity. Similarly, it can be regarded as undemocratic that a matter which affects
only England can actually be decided against the will of a majority of its
representatives when the votes of Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish MPs determine
the outcome of a Parliamentary vote. Although the Scottish National Party’s MPs
have historically adopted a practice of abstaining from voting on English affairs
given their absence of any English mandate, the same cannot be said for MPs from
the UK wide parties representing non-English constituencies. Some votes in
Parliament on matters pertaining only to England have indeed been carried without
the consent of a majority of MPs representing English constituencies owing to the
19 See, e.g., ‘Offer Wales same powers as Scotland, says Carwyn Jones’, BBC News Online, 27
November 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-30226324.
20 HC Deb, 14 November 1977, vol 939, col 123.
21 See, e.g., the report of the McKay Commission (2013: paras. 6–7).
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positive votes of MPs from Scotland and Wales. Examples are found with
legislation on Foundation hospitals and University tuition fees.22
In the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum and proposals for
further devolved powers to Scotland, there has been renewed attention given to the
English question. Only the day after the referendum, Prime Minister David
Cameron alluded to the prospect of English only votes within the Westminster
Parliament,23 a prospect which became a central plank of the Conservative party’s
general election manifesto and extended to votes on income tax setting within
England.24 The House of Commons standing orders were finally amended in
October 2015 to effectively empower MPs representing English constituencies to
veto legislation applicable only to England.25
‘English Only’ Votes
The idea behind ‘English only’ votes in the Westminster Parliament is essentially
that where legislative proposals only apply to England, as opposed to the UK as a
whole, then only those MPs representing English constituencies ought to be
permitted to vote upon these matters, or at least should be empowered to veto the
adoption of the measures in question. In practice, very few bills introduced in
Parliament are applicable only to England, most legislation being also applicable to
Wales. Most so-called ‘English only’ votes will in fact be taken by MPs
representing English and Welsh constituencies.26 More generally, proposals
applicable to some, but not all, parts of the UK could only be voted upon by
MPs representing those parts. This seeks to address the West Lothian question by
ensuring that the outcome of legislative proposals applicable only to a particular
area or areas cannot be determined by MPs representing areas to which they will not
apply. The most obvious target of proposals for ‘English only’ votes are Scottish
MPs voting on bills which do not apply to Scotland.
One advantage of the ‘English only’ votes option as a means of addressing
England’s perceived disadvantage within current UK legislative processes lies in the
fact that it would not require the time-consuming and resource intensive creation of
any new layers of government. It would merely involve the adoption of modified
procedures for existing legislative processes. Herein, perhaps, is the cause of
22 See Hadfield (2004: 247).
23 See ‘David Cameron raises West Lothian question after Scotland vote: ‘English votes for English
laws’, The Guardian, 19 September 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/19/
david-cameron-devolution-revolution-uk-scotland-vote.
24 Conservative Party (2015: 69–70).
25 Standing Orders 83J–83X. Similarly, where legislation is applicable to England and Wales, MPs
serving English and Welsh constituencies enjoy this power of veto.
26 We use the term ‘English only’ votes in the present paper for sake of convenience. However, it is also
used to refer to all situations in which Parliament considers legislative proposals that are only to apply to
some parts of the UK, be this England, England and Wales, or England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In
such cases, references to ‘English only’ votes extend to votes taken by all MPs representing
constituencies in the parts of the UK to which the resulting legislation will apply.
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another advantage, namely the apparent popularity of this initiative among the
electorate within England.27 Arguably, the increased powers to be devolved to
Scotland have only strengthened English feeling that the legislative affairs of the
Westminster Parliament which only affect England should be entrusted specifically
to English MPs. The Conservative party has made the case for ‘English only’ votes,
although this support must be understood in the context of the potential advantages
which such a move could have for it politically, given the Conservatives’ electoral
strength lies in England, it being poorly represented in Scotland,28 and to a lesser
extent, Wales. The merits of ‘English only’ votes, however, can only be evaluated
once we understand how such procedures will be implemented and their
constitutional implications.
Models for ‘English Only’ Votes
There are a number of variants upon a model for ‘English only votes, which range in
terms of their impact upon established legislative procedures from merely
strengthening the extent to which English MPs are specifically consulted upon
legislative proposals that will only apply to England to giving them the sole right to
vote on these. Although not original proposals, in the aftermath of the Scottish
independence referendum the Conservative Party advanced three alternative options
for delivering some form of ‘English only’ votes for bills intended to apply only to
England.29 These alternative proposals were stated to be guided by the McKay
principle,30emanating from the earlier report of the McKay Commission, namely
that matters affecting a particular constituent part of the UK should only be decided
upon with the consent of a majority of MPs representing that area.31
The first option (the Reformed Consideration of Bills at All Stages) was modelled
on an earlier proposal of the Norton Commission,32 and envisaged that legislation
affecting only England would be considered at all stages only by MPs representing
English constituencies. By convention, MPs representing other parts of the UK
would not vote.33 This is the most absolute approach to the implementation of
‘English only’ votes, conferring MPs representing English constituencies with the
27 See McKay Commission (2013: 16) for polling data which showed that 81 % of English voters agreed
that Scottish MPs should not vote on bills only affecting England. See also commentary provided by
YouGov in October 2014, ‘England’s awkward answer to the West Lothian Question’, available at https://
yougov.co.uk/news/2014/10/20/englands-awkward-answer-west-lothian-question/.
28 This may, arguably, become less of an issue if the results of the 2015 general election in Scotland are a
sign of things to come. Labour, the Conservative, and Liberal Democrats all only won one seat. It is,
however, more likely that SNP MPs would vote with Labour than the Conservatives where neither party
commands a majority in the House of Commons. See, e.g., ‘SNP will ‘never, ever’ prop up a
Conservative government, Nicola Sturgeon says’, The Telegraph, 14 November 2014, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11230432/SNP-will-never-ever-prop-up-a-
Conservative-government-Nicola-Sturgeon-says.html.
29 Cabinet Office (2014: 24–27).
30 Cabinet Office (2014: 24).
31 McKay Commission (2013: paras. 12 and 109).
32 Commission to Strengthen Parliament (2000).
33 Cabinet Office (2014: 25).
The ‘English Question’: Why ‘English Votes’ are Not the… 263
123
sole decision-making function over legislation only applicable to England. The
second option (the Reformed Amending Stages of Bills) was modelled on a
proposal of the 2008 Democracy Task Force34 and envisaged that only MPs
representing English constituencies would consider bills applicable only to England
at the committee and report stage, where amendments are proposed and voted upon.
The ultimate decision on the adoption of the bill would remain with Parliament.35
While arguably enhancing the role of English MPs in processing ‘English bills’,
there is no fundamental change to the principle that Parliament as a whole is entitled
to vote upon the adoption of legislation. The final option (the Reformed Committee
Stage and Legislative Consent Motions) effectively envisages a power of veto over
English only legislation for MPs representing English constituencies. While bills
would still be subject to a third reading in the full House of Commons, a Grand
Committee of English MPs would need to give their consent to a bill prior to this
stage in order for it to proceed.36 This option is along the lines of that advanced by
the McKay Commission,37 and was subsequently expressed to be the favoured
option of the Conservative party,38 and eventually introduced via amendments to
standing orders. Although theoretically the full House retains the final word on the
adoption of English bills, in reality this option merely retains constitutional
formalities while introducing a distinction between different kinds of legislation
based upon the intended geographical scope of its application. However, while
English MPs will ultimately determine if a bill can succeed, oddly their wishes
could be overridden where the full House chooses not to pass a bill at its third
reading.
Constitutional Implications
Notwithstanding the logic underpinning arguments for English only votes and
apparent popular support for such a move,39 significant constitutional implications
arise from taking such a step and in the view of this author it should be rejected as a
‘solution’ to the English question. Although the extent to which English only votes
give rise to constitutional concern is dependent upon the nature of the model
adopted, six points might be noted as cause for further consideration. Firstly, as
Leyland notes, ‘‘The [UK] has traditionally been built on an equality whereby all
members can vote on all matters…as members of a single parliamentary body.’’40
The Westminster Parliament is the sovereign legislative body of the UK as a whole,
34 Democracy Task Force (2008).
35 Cabinet Office (2014: 25–26).
36 Cabinet Office (2014: 26–27).
37 McKay Commission (2013: paras. 14–20).
38 See ‘William Hague unveils plans to stop Scottish MPs voting on English issues’, The Guardian, 3
February 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/03/william-hague-plan-bar-
scottish-mps-voting-english-issues.
39 According to a poll cited by Curtice (2006: 123), in the aftermath of devolution to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, 60 % of English voters agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that Scottish MPs
should not vote on English matters at Westminster.
40 Leyland (2005: 444).
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and to introduce different classes of votes on legislative proposals risks the creation
of a two-tier system of MPs in which Scottish MPs especially, and to varying
extents Northern Irish and Welsh MPs will play a much lesser role in Parliamentary
business than their English counterparts. This would create something of a
constitutional anomaly, in which the state’s primary and sovereign legislature does
not provide equal representation for all of its population. It is neither fair to the
English, who lack the same dedicated devolved institutions as their Scottish, Welsh
and Northern Irish counterparts, nor to the latter nations for whom the legislature of
the Union becomes a part-time affair in which they are to play second fiddle to the
affairs of the English. This could be avoided if a separate English body (or bodies)
was established for the purpose of legislating on England specific matters, akin to
the devolved legislative bodies which exist in Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland, leaving the Westminster Parliament to tackle UK wide matters in which all
representatives perform an equal role. The consequences of English only votes risk
strengthening separatist causes in the UK’s constituent parts, especially Scotland, if
the populations of these areas come to feel that their representation and participation
within UK wide structures has become diluted. The narrow defeat for Scottish
independence in 2014’s referendum and the subsequent surge in SNP support
leading to its phenomenal success in the 2015 general election should be cause for
concern in this respect.
A more practical constitutional problem potentially arises from the political
demographics of England vis-a`-vis the UK as a whole. Unlike the other constituent
parts of the UK, England does not have its own government. The UK government,
ordinarily formed by the party or parties able to obtain a majority in the
Westminster Parliament, is essentially also the government for England. It is a
fundamental constitutional principle that a government must be able to command
the confidence of the House of Commons.41 However, situations can conceivably
arise in which a UK government is formed by a party (or coalition of parties) which
does not hold a majority of English constituencies. This is unlikely ever to be a
problem for a Conservative led government, which draws its overwhelming strength
from England, but could prove to arise in respect of a Labour government with a
small UK wide majority in Parliament that is dependent upon Scottish and Welsh
MPs.42 The outcome may be that such a government would struggle to implement
its legislative agenda within England, undermining its very position as the sitting
government. This would be most bizarre, it being ‘‘an accepted feature of the
Westminster system that a government must get its legislation.’’43 As the eminent
constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor has suggested, ‘‘a bifurcated government is
a logical absurdity.’’44 The effective government may essentially change depending
upon whether a matter is considered to be ‘‘English’’ or ‘‘UK-wide’’, with the UK
41 See, e.g., The Cabinet Office (2011: 2, 14, 21).
42 For example, in the 1964 general election, although Labour won a UK wide majority, it trailed the
Conservatives by 16 seats in England. Similarly, despite securing a majority of 1 in the October 1974
general election, Labour again trailed the Conservatives in England.
43 Hazell (2001: 278).
44 Bogdanor (2014).
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opposition simultaneously being able to dictate the outcome of legislative proposals
for England. In an extreme scenario, Bogdanor envisages circumstances in which
‘‘English policies’’ are implemented against the will of the government, which is
then compelled to fund them.45 This is a recipe for constitutional chaos. It may even
mean that a UK government, with a UK wide majority in Parliament, has to enter
into agreements (or even coalition) with smaller parties in order to effectively
legislate for England. If this is not possible, a government with a UK-wide majority
may even be compelled to resign, disproportionately empowering a minority UK
party which might be able to obtain a simple majority of English seats. The potential
instability threatened should be a cause for concern, although one unintended
consequence may be increased support for a system of proportional representation,
as one of the principal objections to its introduction—producing unstable govern-
ment—would be difficult to sustain if electoral outcomes were already resulting
in situations in which UK governments were increasingly forced to rely on alliances
and coalitions to govern England.46
Third, the idea of English only votes may be implementable within the House of
Commons, but it must not be forgotten that all bills must pass through both
chambers, and it would be difficult to apply this principle to the procedures of the
House of Lords.47 Its unelected members do not represent constituencies, nor are
accountable to groups of people resident in any designated areas, but sit as
individuals in their own right. This problem may, however, be overstated given the
relatively limited power of the House of Lords. As a consequence of the Parliament
Acts 1911 and 1949,48 bills passed by the Commons may only be delayed, not
blocked indefinitely, by the Lords, and a bill rejected in the Commons cannot
proceed on the basis of support in the Lords. From a practical standpoint, supporters
of English only votes are predominantly concerned with legislative processes
adopted within the House of Commons.49
A fourth issue concerns the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the key tenets
of which are that Parliament may legislate on any matter which it so chooses, and
that no Parliament may bind its successors.50 From this perspective, there is no
obstacle to Parliament choosing to enact new rules which govern its’ legislative
procedures. As Zhou writes, ‘‘as a matter of logic, Parliament’s unlimited legislative
power…extend[s] to the power to make rules changing its existing lawmaking
process as much as it wants.’’51 In constitutional terms, the adoption of ‘‘English
45 Bogdanor (2009: 103).
46 Indeed, there is already evidence that the popular vote has entered a stage of fragmentation in which
the shares obtained by the major parties, and their ability to obtain parliamentary majorities, has begun to
decline. Whereas the combined Labour-Conservative share of the vote was almost 94 % in 1945, this had
declined to just 65 % in 2010.
47 See Leyland (2005: 446).
48 Sections 1–2, Parliament Act 1911, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949.
49 Note, however, proposals from some quarters to transform the House of Lords into a second chamber
in which the UK’s constituent parts receive equal representation as part of a new constitutional settlement
for the UK.
50 Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590, at p. 597 (per Maugham L.J.).
51 Zhou (2013: 613).
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only’’ votes might be compared to the provisions of the Parliament Acts of 1911 and
1949, which significantly curtailed the role played by the House of Lords in
legislative processes, and have been widely accepted as having been constitutionally
legitimate devices.52 Parliament may change the procedures by which certain
statutes are made, but as it cannot bind future parliaments, such procedures cannot
be entrenched and are subject to later reversal or revision. The Conservative
government is likely to be able, by virtue of its majority in the House of Commons,
was able to amend the process through which provisions affecting only England are
passed into law, but a future government of a different mind can readily reverse
these. The controversy arises from the intention to introduce new procedures
through amendments to the House of Commons’ standing orders. It might be
questioned whether it is appropriate for the collective decision-making power of the
House of Commons to be restricted by any process other than a collective
expression of its support for such a change through the enactment of a provision to
this effect contained in primary legislation. Of course, as the full house retains the
final decision over the adoption of legislation—with English MPs only empowered
to veto measures at a committee stage—the argument can be made that there is no
real impact upon parliamentary sovereignty in strict terms. The move towards
‘‘English only’’ votes is only possible because the current government has a UK
wide majority, which means that more often than not it should be able to pass its
legislative agenda anyway. Ironically, this device would not be able to strike its’
main target, namely a Labour government which lacked an English majority, as
such a government could simply revise procedures itself to abolish ‘‘English only’’
votes.
From some perspectives, the focus on English only votes overlooks the inherent
consequences of any system of political representation in which the wishes of the
representatives of any region can be overridden by the majority vote of the
collective whole. For example, there remain votes which take place in the
Westminster parliament on UK wide matters whereby legislation is implemented for
constituent parts of the UK where a majority of elected members for those areas
opposed the measures in question. A classic often cited example is the application of
the poll tax to Scotland.53 Even within England, there will inevitably be regions that
are poorly represented by the majority party or parties within the House of
Commons,54 which can make similar arguments about the unfairness of legislative
decisions affecting those regions not to have consented to them. Undoubtedly, the
core tenet of the arguments of supporters of English only votes concerns a lack of
equality between England and the other countries forming the UK. However, this
arguably produces a case for some form of similar mechanisms within England as
exist in those other countries, as opposed to tinkering with one of the anomalies of
52 See, e.g., Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56. Note Lord Bingham’s suggestion (at para. 27)
that a ‘‘question of parliamentary procedure…could only, be the subject of parliamentary inquiry’’ and
was not an issue appropriate for investigation by the courts.
53 Hadfield (2005: 298–301).
54 Contrast, for example, the East of England—where only four of fifty-eight MPs elected in 2015
represented Labour—with the North-East, which in the same election returned twenty-six Labour MPs
from its twenty-nine constituencies.
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any national legislative system while being unable to address all of them. The
argument can also be made that the adoption of ‘English only’ votes addresses the
wrong question, which is how to ensure that Parliament’s composition delivers
representation which reflects the voting preferences of the electorate, the answer to
which lies in the introduction of some form of proportional representation, an issue
which received fresh attention following the outcome of the 2015 general election in
which parties polling significant shares of the vote obtained very few seats.55
A final problem arises from the potential for bills which might be designated as
‘English’ to impact upon affairs in other parts of the UK,56 for example provisions
affecting public services in England which may be used by residents of Scotland,
Wales or Northern Ireland, for example health or educational facilities.57 Although
it might be assumed that a distinction can be drawn between bills impacting upon
other parts of the UK and bills which do not, this is arguably simplistic and not so
straightforward in practice.58 For example, where decisions are taking on so-called
‘‘English’’ matters which involve public expenditure, the argument has been made
that these are relevant to all parts of the UK as they ‘‘will directly affect the size of
the block fund going to a devolved body.’’59 The recent changes provide that the
speaker of the House of Commons will certify when a legislative proposal is an
‘‘English only’’ matter,60 but given some of the contentious issues alluded to, this
threatens to draw the traditionally neutral and independent speaker into matters
inherently political in nature.
Addressing the English Question Through New Institutions
An English Parliament
Whereas the ‘English only’ votes option might be regarded as a ‘quick-fix’ or
‘kneejerk’ reaction to pressures for greater fairness for England within the UK
constitutional framework, more substantive and principled constitutional change
could arguably be achieved through two main mechanisms. One of these,
considered below, is the introduction of a number of regional assemblies throughout
England conferred with devolved powers along similar lines to that currently
enjoyed by the institutions established in the other constituent parts of the UK. The
other mechanism is the creation of an English Parliament to function separately
55 See, e.g., ‘UKIP and Greens lead calls for electoral reform—but what are the alternatives?’, The
Independent, 9 May 2015, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/
ukip-and-greens-lead-calls-for-electoral-reform–but-what-are-the-alternatives-10238928.html. Collec-
tively, UKIP, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens obtained over 24 % of the popular vote, yet only took
10 Parliamentary seats between them (8 Liberal Democrat and 1 each for the other parties), amounting to
just 1.6 % of the overall number.
56 McKay Commission (2013: paras. 9–11).
57 Russell and Lodge (2006: 84–88).
58 See, e.g., Bogdanor (2014).
59 Bogdanor (2009: 104).
60 Standing Order 83J (1).
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from the Westminster Parliament effectively as a devolved legislative body for
England akin to the manner in which the Scottish Parliament serves such a function
for Scotland. This would mark the creation of a federal UK constitutional structure.
As by far the largest of the UK’s constituent parts, the legislative powers conferred
upon an English Parliament would be expected to be substantial and more in line
with those enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament than the more limited powers of the
Welsh Assembly.
The creation of a federal UK constitutional structure within which legislative
bodies exist for all four constituent parts of the union has some logic to it.
Theoretically, it addresses the very problem posed by the English question while
avoiding the creation of a two tier system. It could provide an English governmental
mechanism that is both transparent and democratic.61 Equality is guaranteed
between the four parts of the Union. Matters directly affecting each country
individually would be largely handled at that level, while there would remain a UK
wide government and Parliament responsible for matters pertaining to the UK as a
whole. Such federal structures abound, with the US, Canada, and Australia some of
the more prominent examples of states in which power is shared between a federal
government and a series of states or provinces. Obstacles to the creation of an
English Parliament arise however, from both a lack of popular support and practical
dangers.62
There is little public support for such a step among the English electorate,63
which is perhaps best understood within the context of a general disinclination to
create further layers of government. As Russell and Lodge note, ‘‘While the notion
of ‘English votes on English laws’ appears to be winning popular support there is no
sign yet that the English have an appetite for its logical corollary, an English
Parliament.’’64 In a 2012 poll only 20 % of English voters supported the creation of
an English Parliament, in contrast to 36 % support for English only votes within the
UK Parliament.65 As the dominant actor within UK-wide structures, England’s
electorate is arguably rather satisfied with the suitability of those structures, but
simply wishes to tailor them to serve England’s interests better in certain defined
circumstances (i.e., English only votes for English matters).
Although popular opinion is not fixed, meaning that current opposition should not
be used as sufficient reason to discourage proposals for an English Parliament that
are based on sound principle, practical objections to its creation have also been
advanced. Given the large proportion of the UK population which England accounts
for,66 while the creation of an English Parliament may address some current English
61 Russell and Lodge (2006: 88–89).
62 See Leyland (2005: 445).
63 The only notable organisation pushing for an English Parliament is the Campaign for an English
Parliament. See http://www.thecep.org.uk/.
64 Russell and Lodge (2006: 89).
65 Cited in McKay Commission (2013: 18). A similarly low level of support was identified by the Future
of England Survey conducted by Jeffery et al (2014: 18–19).
66 83.9 % according to the 2011 UK Census, available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/
census/2011/uk-census/index.html.
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grievances, it is suggested that this would not help perceptions of the other regions
within the UK that it is dominated by England. Indeed, English dominance at
Westminster was a key factor in the growth of support for Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish devolution. The legislative powers enjoyed by the UK’s constituent
parts would be unlikely to be identical, just as Scotland’s powers currently exceed
those conferred upon Wales, and to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland. English
grievances may be replaced by an aggrieved Welsh electorate, which perhaps finds
itself as the ‘poor relation’ in any new constitutional arrangement.
The creation of an English Parliament may indirectly further the cause of
separatism on the part of other constituent parts of the UK, in particular Scotland. In
a new federal UK, there is a risk that the Westminster Parliament and government
would perform a relatively small role if an English Parliament took on for England
many of the functions currently performed by that Parliament, calling into question
the very purpose of UK wide institutions. Within federal states there is a tendency
for there to be a body representing its constituent parts on an equal footing, in the
way, for example that the US Senate provides equal representation to all fifty
states.67 This generates a sense of equality and unity across the federal state.
Nothing like this exists within the UK, although one option canvassed has been to
replace the House of Lords with a second chamber which affords equal
representation to England’s regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.68 It
has, however, been noted that there is no precedent for a successful federal structure
in which one part accounts for five-sixths of the total population, as England does
within the UK.69 For example, by sake of comparison, the largest states within the
US, Australia and Canada only account for 12,70 3271 and 38.5 %72 of their overall
populations respectively and in national terms amount to a minority within the
collective whole.
Regional Devolution Within England
The introduction of a coherent system of regional devolution within England might
be regarded as a more appropriate and less constitutionally problematic means of
addressing the English question than the full-blown federalism that would be
67 While membership of the House of Representatives is based on elections held in 435 districts of
roughly equal population size, each state elects two senators. Representation in Australia’s senate is also
equal among its six states.
68 See, e.g., ‘Miliband calls for second chamber to represent all UK’s cities and regions’, The Guardian,
31 October 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/31/miliband-devolution-
elected-second-chamber-regions.
69 Hazell (2001: 268). Hazell suggests that ‘‘there is no successful federation in the world where one of
the parts is greater than around one third of the whole.’’
70 California, according to the US Census Bureau (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/
data/counties/totals/2014/CO-EST2014-01.html.
71 New South Wales, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014), available at http://www.
abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0.




shepherded in through the creation of an English Parliament. It is similar in that it
envisages the transfer of power from the Westminster Parliament to further English
interests, but instead of identifying these in collective ‘English’ terms, it recognises
these as best represented on a region-by-region basis throughout England, with a
series of assemblies established to exercise decision-making powers in respect of
each English region. One attraction of such a model lies in that it may be more
appropriate for taking account of the size and diversity of England, representing as it
does such an overwhelming share of the overall UK population. Using the nine
administrative regions of England used for electing members of the European
Parliament,73 the resulting regional institutions would represent populations more
akin in size to that of Scotland.74 The devolved institutions created could potentially
result in a constitutional structure for the UK that bore some resemblance to those of
successful federations, such as those already mentioned.
In practical terms, the regional option appears less controversial or constitution-
ally problematic than does the creation of an English Parliament. In some respects,
it arguably represents a natural next step in a process already begun in which various
regional fora exist to represent regional interests,75 stemming at least as far back as
the creation of the Regional Development Agencies by the Blair government in
1999.76 The establishment the following year of the Greater London Authority and
an elected mayor for London might also be regarded as a step in the direction of
devolving power to the English regions.77 A strong case for regional government
throughout England can also be made in support of the principle of subsidiarity.78
The problem, however, lies again in the apparent lack of any enthusiasm among the
English population for regional government.79 Following a white paper produced by
the Blair government,80 which gave eight English regions the option of establish a
regional assembly,81 in June 2003 proposals were announced for referenda to be
held in the North-East, North-West, and Yorkshire and the Humber on the question
73 See Office for National Statistics: Regions, available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/
geography/beginner-s-guide/administrative/england/government-office-regions/index.html.
74 Based on the 2011 UK census, five regions have larger populations than Scotland (South-East, Greater
London, North-West, East and West Midlands), four smaller (South-West, Yorkshire and the Humber,
East Midlands and North-East).
75 See Leyland (2005: 447–453).
76 See Lodge and Mitchell (2006: 106–117).
77 For the background to this development, see Bogdanor (2009: 197–213).
78 Originating as a principle of European Union law, subsidiarity holds that decision-making functions
should be exercised at the most appropriate level in accordance with economy and efficiency. See Barnett
(2011: 148–149).
79 See McKay Commission (2013: 18). A 2012 poll only uncovered support from 8 % of the English
electorate for the creation of regional assemblies. See also the Future of England Survey (2014), which
put support at 9 %. A 2003 poll, however, did put support higher at 24 %. See Curtice (2006: 121).
Furthermore, there is no significant regional variation apparent in support for regional assemblies (p.
123), although a 2003 poll placed support in the North-East 12 % higher than in the Eastern and South-
East regions (33 vs 21 %).
80 See Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002). For discussion, see Leyland
(2005: 453–456).
81 Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002: ch. 9).
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of the creation of such assemblies in those areas.82 Following an overwhelming
rejection of the proposals by the electorate in the North-East,83 the other proposed
referenda were abandoned.84
Apart from a possible lack of appetite for a new tier of government or general
satisfaction with existing constitutional arrangements as far as England is
concerned, two observations might be made in respect of the absence of support
for regional bodies. One difficulty arises in constructing regions with a sufficient
degree of shared identity to underpin support for regional decision-making
mechanisms. The nine administrative regions are artificial constructs encompassing
diverse areas whose populations may not naturally identity with one another, nor the
large regions within which they are placed. For example, the North-West region
encompasses the relatively urban Greater Manchester and Merseyside as well as the
more rural Cheshire and Cumbria. Many people are more likely to identify with a
county, such as Yorkshire or Lancashire, although the viability of tiers of
government located at the country level is questionable given their relatively small-
size. Even then, such regional identities will often be weak in comparison to the
national identities of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.85 Secondly, a key factor
in generating support for their creation may be the conferment of significant
executive and legislative powers upon regional bodies. It is notable that the powers
proposed for the assemblies for the North-East, North-West, and Yorkshire and the
Humber were very limited in contrast to those enjoyed by the devolved bodies in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,86 and would have only been conferred with
budgets comprising 3–4 % of total regional spending,87 which may explain their
lack of support.
Notwithstanding some of the difficulties which would need to be addressed
before proceeding down this route, a sound practical and democratic case can be
made for the creation of a tier of devolved regional government within England. It is
not a pre-requisite for the establishment of regional institutions that the local
populations consent to their creation. Arguably, however, some form of democratic
legitimacy is desirable. Any attempt to create regional fora is therefore likely to
require considerable effort by way of public information campaigns and similar
initiatives.
82 See ‘Regional assembly vote dates set’, BBC News Online, 8 July 2004, available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3876437.stm.
83 See ‘North east votes ‘no’ to assembly’, BBC News Online, 5 November 2004, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3984387.stm.
84 See ‘Prescott rules out regional polls’, BBC News Online, 8 November 2004, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3992435.stm.
85 Furthermore, even within country regions there will be limits to shared identities, for example urban
and rural areas perceiving their core interests in different terms.
86 Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002: ch. 4).




Localism: A Piecemeal Solution
An important development for the devolution of power within England during
recent years has been the promotion of the ‘localism’ agenda, which broadly
speaking has seen attempts to enhance decision-making powers exercised upon a
local level. The Blair government gave local authorities the option to establish
executive style government under the leadership of a directly elected mayor.88
Building upon this, the Localism Act 2011 introduced by the Coalition government
sought to strengthen local power further by establishing a general power of
competence for local authorities,89 giving rise to the assumption that they are
empowered to do anything not specifically prohibited. The Act also provided for
referendums to be held in England’s larger cities on the option of having an elected
mayor,90 and empowered ministers to transfer powers from central government to
local authorities.91 While most cities rejected the elected mayor option in 2012,92
the government pressed ahead with other aspects of the localism agenda. Proposals
are currently in motion for the creation of ‘super authorities’, combined local
authorities with enhanced powers to take local decisions and discharge budgets
delegated from central government.93 In a key development, it was announced in
early 2015 that a new combined Greater Manchester authority would be conferred
with authority over the region’s £6 billion NHS budget.94
The merits of the aforementioned developments are beyond the scope of the
present discussion, although they do indicate a growing perception that the dispersal
of power on a local or regional level is desirable. Potentially such steps may
eventually lead to more substantive devolution within England along the lines of the
kind of regional government which we have already expressed a preference for as a
means of addressing the English question. However, the current localism agenda is
insufficient for this purpose. It represents a piecemeal approach in which different
decision-making structures will exist in different areas, entrusted with varying
degrees of decision-making authority. The localism agenda to date has been marked
by ad hoc developments devoid of any coherent of consistent vision for the
enhancement of local or regional decision-making within England. Nor does it
entail the devolution of primary legislative powers along the lines in which these
have been conferred upon the existing devolved institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff
and Belfast. Although to some extent a degree of diversity may be justified by
reference to the varying needs and desires of different localities, to address the
88 Local Government Act 2000, s. 14. A move towards a directly elected mayor initially required
approval by local referendum (section 27), although this requirement was removed by the Local




92 See, e.g., ‘Nine cities reject elected mayors’, BBC News, 4 May 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-politics-17949950.
93 See Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill 2015.
94 See ‘Greater Manchester to control £6 bn NHS budget’, 25 February 2015, available at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-31615218.
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English question satisfactorily requires a regional tier of government far more
robust, coherent, and uniform than what currently exists or is proposed.
Conclusions
Essentially, the English question has two key parts to it. The first concerns voting
processes within the Westminster Parliament which stem directly from the West
Lothian question. The second is about enhancing decision-making powers within
England through other fora. In many respects, the problem is exacerbated because
the UK structure essentially suits England,95 the population of which desires no
radical constitutional restructuring, but is sufficiently aggrieved at the impact of
devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to demand some form of
redress which takes account of the English question. The natural conclusion of such
pressures is a relatively ‘quick-fix’ solution in response to the first part of the
question: English only votes, as successfully implemented by the Conservative
party. While English only votes within the Westminster Parliament appear to enjoy
considerable popular support, as we have already established, this mechanism gives
rise to various constitutional problems. Against this context it is difficult to disagree
with the conclusion of Vernon Bogdanor that, ‘‘for the time being, therefore, the
West Lothian [aspect of the English] question will have to remain unanswered.’’96
This does not mean, however, that the English question cannot be addressed through
the devolution of greater power within England.
Some form of the regional option, in which considerable power is wielded on a
regional level, appears to be the most appropriate option. However, any attempt to
address the English question is required to grapple with popular opinion,
practicability, and constitutional implications. Tensions arise between these
competing considerations and the most obvious prima facie solutions to the English
question all appear to come with their drawbacks. An English Parliament or
Regional Assemblies lack popular support, and the former threatens to produce
dangerous constitutional implications, while the current localism agenda is not a
substantive solution to the problem which lies at the heart of the English question.
Any proposed solution to the English question should be underpinned by some
guiding principles. Two observations are particularly pertinent here. Firstly, any
change should not undermine the status of the Westminster Parliament as the
sovereign legislative body of the whole of the UK, and any measures which lead to
the creation of a two tier system of MPs should be avoided. This risks undermining
the very union itself. Secondly, the politically most popular option for addressing
the English question may not necessarily be the most appropriate from a
constitutional perspective. If necessary, time must be taken to make the case for
a better alternative.
95 This has been attributed in part by John Curtice to the fact that most English people feel equally
English and British, meaning that there is no strong urge for a separate English legislative mechanism
comparable to that which exists for the other constituent parts of the UK. See Curtice (2006: 128–138).
96 Bogdanor (2009: 105).
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Although possible to resolve the English question fairly quickly to the
satisfaction of much of the electorate of England, to do so in a manner that is
appropriate to the very constitutional foundations of the UK is likely to prove
extremely difficult. There are no ‘‘easy fixes’’ that come without very damaging
constitutional implications. The need to address the English question is not in
dispute. Charges of unfairness are sufficient in themselves to provoke a serious
debate upon mechanisms for addressing this source of grievance within England.
However, it may well be that the better solutions are not necessarily the most
popular. There should be no rush to resolve a problem with a similarly problematic
solution, but debate should instead centre on approaches that are likely to be
sustainable and effective in the long term.
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